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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Nicolette Alexander filed this interlocutory 
appeal from the District Court’s order denying various pretrial 
motions to dismiss both the original and superseding 
indictments against her on the ground that a victim of one of 
the charged crimes served on the grand jury that returned the 
original indictment.  Because the District Court’s order is not 
a “final decision[]” of the District Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
and is not a “collateral” order subject to immediate review 
under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 




On September 15, 2016 the Government charged 
Alexander and nine co-defendants with conspiracy to defraud 
the United States and theft of government property, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 286 and 18 U.S.C. § 641, respectively.  Nine of 
the ten defendants, including Alexander, were also charged 
with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1).  The indictment described a scheme whereby 
Alexander and her co-defendants filed false tax returns using 
stolen identities to obtain illegal tax refunds.   
 
One of the grand jurors was an alleged victim of this 
scheme.  This juror’s full name was listed in the original 
indictment as a victim of co-defendant Thema Liverpool, and 
4 
 
was also contained in an exhibit presented by the Government 
during the grand jury proceedings.  Moreover, an IRS agent 
investigating the scheme had interviewed the alleged victim 
approximately eight months before the grand jury was 
convened.  Nevertheless, when the Government identified 
Liverpool and the other defendants at the outset of the grand 
jury proceedings and asked whether the jurors knew any of the 
defendants, there were no positive responses.  The alleged 
victim went on to participate in the original grand jury’s 
deliberations and voted along with the other 18 jurors to return 
a true bill. 
   
The Government learned of this alleged defect in the 
original grand jury sometime between January and July of 
2017, leading to “protracted ‘interoffice and interdepartmental 
discussions regarding how to address the matter.’”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 11.  In late September 2018, the Government 
ultimately decided to file a superseding indictment, which was 
returned by a new grand jury on October 5 — about a month 
before trial was scheduled to begin.  The superseding 
indictment made only limited changes to the original 
indictment:  the full names of the victims were replaced with 
their initials and minor alterations were made to the “to wit” 
clauses in certain counts.  The Government disclosed the grand 
jury defect to three defendants who had already pleaded guilty 
under the original indictment, advising them that if they did not 
waive any challenge to the original indictment, they would be 
included in the superseding indictment.   
 
On October 12, 2018, after learning of the grand jury 
defect the night before, co-defendant Joanne Benjamin filed an 
emergency motion to dismiss both indictments, compel 
production of certain grand jury materials, and stay all 
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proceedings.  Alexander filed her own motion to dismiss the 
indictments several days later.  Following a hearing on October 
25, the District Court continued the trial and ordered 
supplemental briefing on the issues raised by the defendants.  
The court also ordered the Government to provide additional 
information on how the grand jury defect was discovered and 
addressed and to file certain grand jury materials under seal for 
in camera review.  Among other things, the moving parties 
argued that the defect in the original grand jury violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause1 as well as Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 6(d).2  They likewise argued that the 
superseding indictment was issued after the statute of 
limitations expired, could not relate back to the defective 
original indictment, and was therefore time-barred.   
 
On October 5, 2019, the District Court denied the 
motions to dismiss.  In relevant part, the court assumed without 
deciding that the defect in the original grand jury was not a 
harmless error, but concluded that any resulting prejudice 
 
1 The Grand Jury Clause provides in relevant part that 
“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury.”  U.S. Const. amend. V. 
2 Both subsections of Rule 6(d) are implicated in this 
appeal.  Rule 6(d)(1) provides:  “The following persons may 
be present while the grand jury is in session: attorneys for the 
government, the witness being questioned, interpreters when 
needed, and a court reporter or an operator of a recording 
device.”  Rule 6(d)(2) provides that “[n]o person other than the 
jurors, and any interpreter needed to assist a hearing-impaired 
or speech-impaired juror, may be present while the grand jury 
is deliberating or voting.” 
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could be cured through the issuance of a valid superseding 
indictment returned by an untainted grand jury.  The court then 
concluded that the superseding indictment in this case was not 
time-barred, was therefore “valid,” and thus cured any error in 
the original grand jury proceedings.3  Alexander timely 




The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).  Our jurisdiction is disputed.  
We have an independent obligation to ascertain whether we 
have jurisdiction, and our “review” of this threshold question 
is plenary.  See United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
 
Typically, the statutory basis for our jurisdiction over 
appeals taken by criminal defendants is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
which permits the courts of appeals to review the “final 
decisions” of federal district courts.  Wright, 776 F.3d at 140.  
In criminal cases, “[t]his ‘final judgment’ rule ordinarily 
‘prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of 
sentence.’”  Id. (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 
259, 263 (1984)).  Alexander has not been convicted or 
sentenced, and the interlocutory order she appeals from is 
concededly not a final judgment.   
 
Nevertheless, Alexander argues we have jurisdiction 
over her appeal under the collateral order doctrine, an 
 
3 In this Court, the Government has advised “that it will 
not proceed to trial on the original indictment,” and will instead 
proceed only on the superseding indictment.  Gov’t Br. 8. 
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exception to the final judgment rule that permits interlocutory 
review by this Court in a narrow range of situations.  See 
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-47.  To be eligible for immediate 
appellate review under the collateral order doctrine, a district 
court order must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed 
question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”  Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 
Alexander’s briefing largely focuses on the third 
condition of the collateral order doctrine, that the order in 
question be “effectively unreviewable.”  She makes two 
arguments that the District Court’s order will be unreviewable 
following conviction.  First, she notes that insofar as the grand 
jury defect here violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(d), the Supreme Court has held that a guilty verdict at trial 
renders any Rule 6(d) violation harmless.  See United States v. 
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986).  Alexander argues that 
because her motion will necessarily be disposed of one way or 
another by a jury verdict — denied if she is convicted, mooted 
if she is acquitted — it will be “effectively unreviewable” 
following final judgment.  See id. at 81 n.1 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that as a result of the Mechanik 
decision, the denial of a Rule 6(d) motion “could conceivably” 
satisfy the collateral order doctrine).  Second, Alexander 
argues that the Grand Jury Clause provides her a right not to be 
tried except pursuant to an indictment, and that a “right not to 
be tried” satisfies the collateral order doctrine’s “effectively 
unreviewable” requirement.  She asserts that the grand jury 
defect here is so fundamental “as to render the original grand 
jury and its indictment void” and, in effect, not an indictment.  





In Mechanik, the defendants learned during trial that 
two Government witnesses had appeared and testified together 
before the grand jury.  475 U.S. at 67-68.  They argued that this 
tandem testimony violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
6(d) and moved to dismiss the indictment on this basis. Id. at 
68.  The trial judge reserved decision on the motion to dismiss 
until the conclusion of trial.  Id. 
 
The Supreme Court assumed that this simultaneous 
testimony violated Rule 6(d) and that any prejudice arising 
therefrom would have justified dismissing at least some 
portion of the indictment had the issue been raised prior to trial.  
Id. at 69-70.  The Court held, however, that the petit jury’s 
guilty verdict rendered “any error in the grand jury proceeding 
connected with the charging decision . . . harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 70.  The Court reasoned that Rule 
6(d) “protects against the danger that a defendant will be 
required to defend against a charge for which there is no 
probable cause to believe him guilty,” id. — that is, that the 
presence of unauthorized individuals before the grand jury will 
lead the grand jury to make charging decisions unsupported by 
probable cause.  But as the Court observed, “the petit jury’s 
subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was 
probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as 
charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Because the trial outcome showed 
that there was probable cause to believe the defendants were 
guilty, any error in the grand jury’s charging decision was 




Alexander may well be correct that, under Mechanik, 
the pre-trial denial of a Rule 6(d) motion is effectively 
unreviewable after trial.  This Court has held that violations of 
the grand jury secrecy provisions in Rule 6(e)4 are not 
immediately appealable.  In so doing, we have repeatedly 
distinguished between violations of Rule 6(d) and Rule 6(e), 
on the assumption that the former are not reviewable following 
trial.  See United States v. Johns, 858 F.2d 154, 157-59 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding that denial of a motion to dismiss based on Rule 
6(e) violations was not immediately appealable under 
Mechanik because “the distinction between assertions of error 
that concern Rule 6(d) and assertions of error that concern Rule 
6(e) . . . does suggest a different outcome in the determination 
of interlocutory review”); see also United States v. Fisher, 871 
F.2d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[W]here the grand jury abuse 
charged involves claimed violations of a defendant’s right to 
fundamental fairness, as distinct from mere technical 
violations such as a 6(d) violation, such issues . . . survive the 
final judgment and are reviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment.”). 
 
If Alexander is correct, however, then her appeal fails 
to satisfy the second condition of the collateral order doctrine:  
the requirement that the disputed order “resolve an important 
issue completely separate from the merits.”  Coopers & 
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  This conclusion is compelled by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United 
States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989).  In Midland, the Court held that 
 
4 The secrecy provisions of Rule 6(e) are voluminous.  
In short, they obligate participants in grand jury proceedings 
not to disclose anything occurring before the grand jury to 
anyone else, save for certain enumerated exceptions. 
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an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment for 
violations of Rule 6(e)’s secrecy provisions does not satisfy the 
collateral order doctrine.  Id. at 799.  The defendant there 
argued that, under Mechanik, Rule 6(e) violations were 
“effectively unreviewable” following trial.  If this were true, 
the Court reasoned, it would be because Rule 6(e) and Rule 
6(d) have the same purpose:  to protect defendants from being 
charged without probable cause, a danger which “has 
demonstrably been avoided whenever there is a guilty verdict 
at trial.”  Id. at 800.  The Court then observed that if Rule 6(e) 
violations are mooted by guilty verdicts because the Rule’s 
purpose is to prevent indictment without probable cause, it 
follows that orders denying motions to dismiss premised on 
violations of Rule 6(e) “cannot be said to ‘resolve an important 
issue completely separate from the merits of the action,’ but 
rather involve ‘considerations enmeshed in the merits of the 
dispute,’ and would ‘affect . . . or be affected by’ the decision 
on the merits of the case.”  Id. (citations omitted).  
 
The same must be true of Rule 6(d).  Under Midland, a 
Rule 6(d) violation is not an issue “completely separate from 
the merits” for the same reason that a conviction renders a Rule 
6(d) violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:  both the 
grand jury’s decision to indict and the petit jury’s decision to 
convict turn on the sufficiency of the evidence, an issue 
“enmeshed in the merits.”  Id.  Insofar as Alexander challenges 
the denial of her Rule 6(d) motion, then, her appeal does not 




Alexander is correct that deprivation of a right not to be 
tried satisfies the third condition of the collateral order doctrine 
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and that the Grand Jury Clause “does indeed confer a right not 
to be tried . . . when there is no grand jury indictment.”  Id. at 
800-02.5  But not every error in grand jury proceedings 
implicates this right not to be tried.  Rather, “[o]nly a defect so 
fundamental that it causes the grand jury no longer to be a 
grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment, 
gives rise to the constitutional right not to be tried.”  Id. at 802. 
 
We have previously observed that since Midland, very 
few federal appellate decisions have identified grand-jury 
errors that supported interlocutory jurisdiction.  Wright, 776 
F.3d at 145.  In Wright, we followed the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, which “in a thorough treatment of the 
subject, limit[ed] jurisdiction under Midland [] to review of 
‘technical challenge[s] to the existence of an indictment,’ such 
as where the defendant may have been indicted by an 
insufficient number of grand jurors.”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Tucker, 745 F.3d 1054, 1069 (10th Cir. 2014)).  In 
Tucker, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit contrasted 
such a technical challenge, which was immediately reviewable, 
with “a substantive challenge to an indictment’s legal 
propriety,” which was not.  745 F.3d at 1069.  In Wright, we 
similarly concluded that an alleged constructive amendment of 
 
5 In Alexander’s case, there are two grand jury 
indictments.  The superseding indictment was returned without 
any alleged errors in the grand jury proceedings.  Although 
Alexander argues that the District Court erred in rejecting her 
argument that the superseding indictment was returned outside 
the statute of limitations, we have observed that “denials of 
motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds fail to 
fulfill in large part the three Cohen criteria.” United States v. 
Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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an indictment was not a “technical or procedural violation that 
would cause ‘the indictment no longer to be an indictment,’” 
and held that a challenge to an alleged constructive amendment 
was not immediately appealable.  776 F.3d at 145 (quoting 
Midland, 489 U.S. at 802). 
 
The grand jury defect Alexander challenges goes to the 
legal propriety of the original indictment and is not “so 
fundamental that it cause[d] the grand jury no longer to be a 
grand jury, or the indictment no longer to be an indictment.”  
Midland, 489 U.S. at 802.  As discussed supra, the danger in 
having unauthorized persons participate in grand jury 
proceedings is that they will bias the jury and cause it to indict 
without probable cause.  To succeed on a challenge to such an 
error, Alexander would likely have to show “that the violation 
substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict,” or 
that there was “grave doubt” to that effect.  Bank of N.S. v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988).  Alexander’s is a 
substantive challenge implicating the merits of the 
Government’s case.  It is not a challenge to the technical 
validity of the indictment, such as a challenge based on having 
insufficient votes to indict, Tucker, 745 F.3d at 1068, or on the 
grand jury’s having “served beyond the time it was validly 
authorized to sit,” United States v. Gillespie, 666 F. Supp. 
1137, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1987).6 
 
6 This Court has at times characterized violations of 
Rule 6(d), which prohibits unauthorized persons from 
participating in grand jury proceedings, as “technical.”  See, 
e.g., Fisher, 871 F.2d at 448; Johns, 858 F.2d at 159.  Those 
cases, however, did not concern whether the grand jury’s 
activity was ultra vires, which is how this Court in Wright and 
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In the absence of applicable authority that supports her 
position, Alexander analogizes to cases where the bias or 
personal interests of judges or petit jurors required new trials 
to be granted or convictions to be reversed.  She argues that 
such cases compel the conclusion that “the conduct by the 
Government here is so contrary to the fundamental concept of 
justice as to render the original grand jury and its indictment 
void.”  Alexander Br. 17.  We are not persuaded.  While the 
principle that “no man can be a judge in his own case,” id. at 
18 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) 
certainly resonates on the disturbing facts of this appeal, the 
cases marshalled by Alexander do not support the conclusion 
that the defect here was “so fundamental that it cause[d] the 
grand jury no longer to be a grand jury.”  Midland, 489 U.S. at 
802.  The cases have little relation to any right not to be tried.  
Nor do they suggest that the proceedings in question were 
“technically” invalid in the sense used by the Wright and 
Tucker decisions — that is, ultra vires or with some other 
constitutive defect.  For example, in United States v. Poole, 
450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971) (cited at Alexander Br. 17), we 
ordered a new trial where a defendant convicted of bank 
robbery was not allowed to ask potential jurors — including a 
bank teller and the spouse of a bank teller — if they or their 
families had ever been victims of robbery.  Id. at 1082-84.  The 
issue of potential juror bias in Poole was one of legal propriety, 
not technical validity — one would not say that the original 
trial in Poole “was not a trial” or was otherwise technically 
invalid. 
   
 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Tucker used the 
phrase “technical challenge.” 
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Accordingly, Alexander’s claim does not implicate the 
right not to be tried under the Grand Jury Clause.  Any 
surviving claims of grand jury error can be reviewed following 
trial.  Alexander’s argument thus fails on the third condition of 
the collateral order doctrine. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
The interlocutory order challenged by Alexander does 
not “resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits” and is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment.”  Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.  It is 
thus not eligible for immediate appellate review under the 




For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Alexander’s 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
